Florida Journal of International Law
Volume 12

Issue 3

Article 3

January 1999

Uniform Contract Law of the People's Republic of China: First
Comparative Look
John Gregory

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil

Recommended Citation
Gregory, John (1999) "Uniform Contract Law of the People's Republic of China: First Comparative Look,"
Florida Journal of International Law: Vol. 12: Iss. 3, Article 3.
Available at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol12/iss3/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UF Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Florida Journal of International Law by an authorized editor of UF Law Scholarship Repository. For
more information, please contact kaleita@law.ufl.edu.

Gregory: Uniform Contract Law of the People's Republic of China: First Com

NOTES

UNIFORM CONTRACT LAW OF THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA: FIRST COMPARATIVE LOOK
John Gregory*
I.

INTRODUCTION ..................................

II.

PARTIES TO CONTRACT ............................

III.

FORMATION OF CONTRACT .........................

IV.

INVALID CONTRACTS ..............................

V.
VI.
VII.
VIII.
IX.
X.

PERFORMANCE OF CONTRACT .......................
...........................
.....................
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT .............................
EXCUSE OF PERFORMANCE .........................
BREACH AND DAMAGES

ASSIGNMENT AND DELEGATION

CONCLUSION ....................................

467
472
474
475
478
481
483
484
485
489

I. INTRODUCTION

The People's Republic of China (PRC) is one of America's most
significant trading partners.' Moreover, the PRC is a country with a newlydeveloping legal system and only the very beginnings of a rule of law.2
After decades of economic central planning, the PRC in recent years has
begun to3develop a market economy and the modem legal system required
to run it.
Modem Chinese contract law began with the passage of the Economic
Contract Law (ECL) in 1982. 4 The ECL represented China's first serious
effort to codify a coherent national law of contracts.' The ECL only applied

* As with all my other accomplishments in life, I dedicate this article to my beloved wife,
Yali Gregory, and to our sweet little daughter, Estelle.
1. See Letterfrom the Chairman United States ofAmerica-China ChamberofCommerce
(visited Oct. 1, 1999) <http://www.usccc.org/ chair.htm>.
2. See James S. McLean & Zhang Yuqiang, China'sForeignEconomic ContractLaw: Its
Significance andAnalysis, 8 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 123 (1987).
3. See Lucie Cheng & Arthur Rosett, Contractwith a Chinese Face: Socially Embedded
Factorsin the Transformationfrom Hierarchyto Market, 1978-1989, 5 J.CHINESEL. 143,196-99
(1991).
4. See Economic Contract Law of the People's Republic of China [hereinafter ECL].
Chinese and English versions are available on-line. See University of Maryland Chinalaw Web
Page (visited Aug. 18, 1999) <http://www.qis.net/chinalaw/prclaw 19.htm>.
5. See Daniel Rubenstein, Legal and Institutional Uncertaintiesin the Domestic Contract
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to domestic contractual relations between Chinese parties. The fundamental
purpose of the law was to facilitate contracting in the PRC's planned
economy. 6 The ECL was followed on March 21, 1985 by the Foreign
Economic Contract Law (FECL).' As the name indicates, the FECL was
designed to apply to foreigners who did business with Chinese entities. The
ECL, the FECL, the General Principles of the Civil Law (GPCL),8 a third
contract law dealing with technologies, 9 and numerous provincial contract
codes, made up the corpusjurisof the law of contract in China.

°

On October 1, 1999 the Uniform Contract Law of the People's Republic
of China (UCL) took effect. " This historic law was enacted by the National
People's Congress (NPC) (the Chinese legislature) on March 15, 1999. For
the first time, one single law of contracts applies to both Chinese-Chinese
as well as Chinese-foreigner contractual relations.' 2 The UCL replaces the
three other national, interim contract laws, the ECL, the FECL, and the
Technology Contract Law, thus the name "Uniform" Contract Law. 3 This
note represents one of the first articles to explore the possible implications
of the UCL on contracts both inside and outside of China.
The UCL is focused on a "market-oriented" economy unlike the three
previous laws which were built around a "planned economy.' 4 "One

Law of the People's Republic of China, 42 MCGILL L.J. 495, 500-02 (1997) (discussing PRC
"contract law" prior to 1978).
6. See Ping Jiang, Draftingthe Uniform ContractLaw in China, 10 COLUM. J. ASIAN L.
245,246 (1996).
7. See Foreign Economic Contract Law of the People's Republic of China [hereinafter
FECLI. Chinese and English versions are available on-line. See Universityof MarylandChinalaw
Web Page (visited Aug. 18, 1999) <http://www.qis.net/ chinalaw>.
8. See HENRY R. ZHENG, CHINA'S CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL LAW 49-50 (1988) (introducing
the PRC Civil Code).
9. See Jiang, supra note 6, at 246 (stating that the GPCL promulgates the basic principles
in contract law, while the ECL, the FECL, and the Technology Contract Law set forth the
substantive standards).
10. See id.
11. See The Uniform Contract Law of the People's Republic of China [hereinafter UCL].
and English versions are available on-line. See Chinese Commercial Law Forum
Chinese
The
(visited Aug. 18, 1999) <http://www.cclaw.net>.
12. See ZHENG, supra note 8, at 49 (explaining that despite some attempts, China has never
(until now) been able to issue a uniformly-codified contract law).
13. Under the old system comprised ofthree different main contract laws and countless local
contract laws, the foreigner, acting under the FECL, when dealing with Chinese parties, whose
third party obligations were governed by the ECL and other local laws, often found himself

enmeshed in a confusing set of contradictory law. See Roy F. Grow, Resolving Commercial
Disputes in China: ForeignFirms and the Role of ContractLaw, 14 NW. J. INT'L L. & BuS. 161,
180 (1993). The UCL has the prospect of relieving this confusion because for the first time, all
parties to a contract will be under the same contract law, both domestic and international. See id.
14. See Wang Xuanjun, Features of the New Contract Law of the People's Republic of
China (visited Sept. 10, 1999) <http://www.eaglelink.com/law-review/w99/wang2.htm>.
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striking aspect of the new contract law is that it tries to solve existing
problems by introducing a fistful of legal concepts borrowed from Western
jurisdictions."'" Furthermore, the new UCL is written by some of the best
legal scholars in China rather than by Communist bureaucrats as was the
case with previous contract laws. 6
Because the UCL has only very recently taken effect, there exists a great
dearth of scholarly review concerning its application. 7 Therefore, this
article relies heavily on previous material dealing with the application ofthe
ECL and the FECL. The ECL and the FECL were enacted specifically to
support the centrally planned economy." In making comparisons with those
laws, this Note will comment on the changes made to the UCL in order to
bolster the newly emerging market economy. In addition, this Note will
consider the UCL's interaction with the GPCL. 9 The United Nations
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods2" (CISG)2 '
and the American Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) will also serve to
contrast and compare the UCL. Many of the new concepts embodied in the
UCL are loosely defined and vague in the absence ofofficial explanation or
implementing measures.2 2 This Note compares and contrasts the terms
employed in the previous laws with the new and retained language in the
UCL. Furthermore this Note reviews scholarly literature dealing with the
application of those previous laws. In this way, conclusions can be drawn
as to how the new UCL will be interpreted and applied. 23 This Note will
15. China's New Contract Law: Unity a Chaos, BUSINESS CHINA, Apr. 12, 1999.
16. See Wang Xuanjun, supra note 14; Jiang, supra note 6, at 245 (explaining the process
of drafting the UCL).
17. The author was not able to find even one article dealing with the final version of the
UCL as it passed in March. The author was able to find two law review articles dealing with early
drafts of the UCL. See Jiang, supra note 6; Wang Liming, An Inquiry into Several Difficult
Problems in Enacting China's Uniform Contract Law, 8 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 351 (1999).
18. Since the 1949 Communist Revolution, the PRC has been primarily, and at times,
exclusively, a Non-Market Economy (NME) which has used a series of "Five Year Plans" as
guiding basis for centrally controlled planned economic development. The principle motivation
behind passing the ECL was to further the state's Five Year Plan by facilitating contracting
between state agencies. The basis of the FECL was more "freedom of contract" (of course with
the idea in mind that "freedom of contract" would attract foreign investment and in that way
indirectly further the state's Five Year Plan). See generally ZHENG, supra note 8 (explaining this
gradual development in Chinese law to suit the new market-oriented economy); Daniel
Rubenstein, supra note 5, at 509 (giving a very broad outline of the development of Chinese
contract law).
19. See Wang Liming, supra note 17, at 349-56.
20. United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, U.N. Doc.
A/Conf.97/18 Annex I (1980) [hereinafter CISG].
21. The PRC ratified the CISG on December 1I, 1986. See id.
22. C.F. Pan, New Law Seen to Paint Over Old in Lighter Shade of Gray, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, July 8, 1999, at 2.
23. Here, the author where possible has relied on the Chinese versions of the different laws
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also comment on how the UCL reflects the drafters' intentions to make a
contract law more firmly based on freedom of contract principles, and thus
more suited to China's aspiring market economy.24
Although China is a signatory to the CISG, the international lawyer
should take care not be lulled into a false sense that he no longer need be
familiar with homegrown Chinese contract law. The UCL may still be the
applicable law even in an international transaction with another CISG
signatory nation, 25 and even more possibly in an international transaction
with a non-CISG signatory nation.26 Furthermore, with the growing number
of American companies participating in Chinese-Foreign joint ventures,
which are considered Chinese legal persons,27 it might even be the case that
the CISG is not applicable at all.2" In certain types of business relationships,
such as Sino-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures, Sino-Foreign Cooperatives,
and various Natural Resource contracts, the application of Chinese law is
mandatory.29 Also as in any country, there are certain elements of
mandatory Chinese law which will apply whether or not the parties contract
and conventions. In the realm of English translations of Chinese legal material, there exist many
diverging and potentially inaccurate translations. Therefore, when comparing phrases from the
ECL to the FECL and then to the new UCL, it is most accurate to use the Chinese text version in
the process. Otherwise, the situation arises where the English translation of the FECL translated
a phrase one way while the English translation of the UCL translated the same Chinese text in a
different way. An analysis of the two English versions would yield the conclusion that the law had
changed. In reality, only the translations diverged.
24. See Jiang. supra note 6, at 257.
25. See CISG, supra note 20, art. 6. Under the CISG, parties may exclude the application
of the Convention where it would otherwise apply. See id.
26. See Jianming Shen, Declaringthe ContractAvoided: The UN. Sales Convention in the
Chinese Context, 10 N.Y. INT'L L. REV. 7,9 (1997) (explaining that "China declared that it would
not be bound by Article 1(1)(b), which provides that the Convention applies where rules of private
international law lead to the application of the law of a Contracting State .... Due to this nonapplicability of Article 1(1 )(b) to China, Chinese domestic laws, instead of Convention provisions,
will govern international sales contracts between a Chinese party and a party of a non-Contracting
State when the rules of private international law lead to the application of Chinese law."); see also
CISG, supra note 20, arts. l(b), 95; RALPH H. FOLSOM ET AL., INTERNATIONAL BusINEss
TRANSACTIONS: A PROBLEM ORIENTED COURSEBOOK 90-91 (explaining that the United States
made a similar declaration as to article I(l)(b), and that Germany made its own declaration that
Germany does not consider states which have made such declarations [presumably China and the
United States] to be "Contracting States" within the meaning of Art. l(1)(b)). The result of
Germany's declaration should be that if a Chinese party and a party from a non-signatory country
were before a German court, the German court would not apply the CISG even though Germany
is a signatory. Choice of Law factors could point to the UCL in such a case.
27. See ZHENG, supra note 8, at 62.
28. Since the Chinese-Foreign Joint venture is considered a Chinese legal citizen, in a
situation where a non-Chinese party, working within such ajoint venture, contracts with a wholly
Chinese party, the resulting relationship is not an international contract and therefore the CISG
is inapplicable.
29. See UCL, supra note 11,art. 126.
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to use a different country's law."
The UCL is a massive document, consisting of over four hundred
twenty-seven articles. No single note could possibly explore the entire law.
The UCL is split into General Principles and Specific Provisions. The
former outlines the substance of contracts in general whereas the latter
addresses specific kinds of contracts dealing in specialized subject matter.3
This Note will focus on the "core" areas of any contract law: Parties to the
Contract, Formation of Contract, Invalidity of Contract, Performance of
Contract, Breach and Damages, Assignment and Delegation, Dispute
Settlement, and Excuse of Performance. 2
In order to illustrate possible different outcomes under the UCL, this
note will refer to a hypothetical: a contract was concluded between Rohm
and Hass International Trading Co. ("Rohm & Haas") and China National
Chemical Import and Export Corporation ("ChemImpex"), a Chinese
importer. The contract called for the sale of pesticides urgently needed in
China to avoid destruction of important crops by a seasonal pest.
Scheduled deliveries were to take place over a period of five years with
periodic payments. The pesticides were to be shipped by the Chinese stateowned shipping company ("Shipper"). ChemImpex notified Rohm & Haas
that the particular type of pesticide was to be used to eliminate a particular
type of insect. ChemImpex made Rohm & Haas aware that the pesticide
would be used immediately following delivery. The first pesticides were
delivered to Shipper and arrived in China without incident. Upon their
arrival and inspection, however, the pesticides did not conform to the
specifications of the contract. The effect of the lack of conformity was such
that the delivered pesticides would not be suitable for eliminating the
particular type of insect. As a result, many farmers who had contracted with
Chemlmpex to buy the pesticides lost their crops. Naturally, these farmers
sued Chemlmpex for failure to deliver the pesticides.33

30. See McLean & Zhang, supra note 2, at 132-33.
31. See generally UCL, supra note 11. The General Principles consists of such contract
fundamentals as Formation of Contracts, Validity of Contracts, Performance of Contracts,
Amendment and Assignment of Contracts, Discharge of Contractual Rights and Obligations, and
Breach. The Specific Provisions consists of specialized rules for Sales Contracts, Contracts for
Supply of Power, Water, Gas, or Heat, Gift Contracts, Contracts for Loan of Money, Financial
Leasing Contracts, Technology Contracts, etc. See id.
32. The author borrowed this sequence from Zheng's discussion of the FECL. See ZHENG,
supra note 8, at 62-69.
33. The author borrowed and liberally modified this scenario to suit present purposes from
an article discussing the FECL. See Shen, supra note 26, at 15.
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II. PARTIES TO CONTRACT
The UCL seems to settle long-lingering questions over who has the

capacity to contract in the PRC.34 Under the FECL, a Chinese individual
could not be a party to a contract.35 The FECL applied, on the foreign side,
to foreign individuals, enterprises, or other economic organizations, but on

the Chinese side, only to PRC "enterprises" or "other economic
organizations."36 This restriction on capacity to contract was a significant
impediment to freedom of contract.
Under the FECL, a foreign party had to ensure that the Chinese party
was actually an "enterprise" within the Chinese meaning, otherwise the
contract would be invalid.37 If it turned out later on that the Chinese entity
was not properly approved and registered, the contract might not be
protected under the FECL.38

The new UCL no longer distinguishes capacity to contract based on
whether a party is domestic or foreign. The UCL gives contractual capacity

to "natural persons,39 legal persons, or other organizations with equal
standing."' Therefore, in terms of the hypothetical, ChemImpex could
contract with Rohm & Haas under both the FECL and the UCL (assuming
ChemImpex met the definition of a Chinese "enterprise"). However, under
the FECL, a Chinese individual would have been precluded from dealing

34. See Cheng & Rosen, supra note 3, at 207-16. Cheng and Rosett explain how the various
factors in Chinese history and government in the past had led the PRC government to deny
individuals the capacity to contract. See id. Since individuals could not contract, in the era of
economic reform of the 1980s, individuals would borrow names of economic organizations in
order to be able to contract. See id. This led to much confusion when entities such as Universities
(which had capacity to contract) set up businesses as surrogates for Chinese individuals who did
not have the capacity to contract. See id. Because the UCL now allows individuals to contract, this
phenomena should diminish.
35. This is not to say that the Chinese individual could not contract. See id. The individual's
contractual obligations, however, would be governed by principles outlined in the GPCL rather
than in the ECL or the FECL. "Thus a Chinese individual who purchase[d] a car from aJapanese
company [would] not be covered by the [FECL]; instead, the general rules on contract outlined in
the Civil Code [would] apply." ZHENG, supra note 8, at 63. But see Rubenstein, supra note 5, at
512 (discussing the lack of Chinese individuals' capacity to contract even under the GPCL).
36. See FECL, supra note 7, art. 2.
37. See McLean & Zhang, supra note 2, at 131-32.
38. See Rubenstein, supra note 5, at 513.
39. UCL, supra note 11, art. 2. The Chinese version uses a literal translation of the English
term "natural person" which is"ziran ren." See id. Neither the ECL nor the FECL used this term,
even when applying to foreigners in their capacity as individuals, as "natural persons." This shift
to the literal translation of the English "natural person" seems to be a reaffirmation that the UCL
is intended to be in greater conformance with international practices than previous Chinese
contract laws.
40. Id.
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with Rohm & Haas whereas the UCL may now apply to such transactions.
The FECL's "economic organization" was replaced in the UCL by
"organization" from which it seems that the UCL applies to agreements of
an even non-economic nature, thus widening the UCL's scope of
application." This expansion of parties with the capacity to contract further
bolsters the claim that the UCL is based on principles of freedom of
contract.42
In considering parties to a contract, the position of third-party
beneficiaries is also important. Under American law, depending on the
parties' intentions vis-A-vis a third party, a third-party, not actually privy to
the contract may have enforceable rights under the contract.43 Previous
Chinese contract law did not provide for third parties to have enforceable
rights in contracts to which they were not privy. 44
For purposes of the hypothetical, Rohm & Haas would like to know if
it might be directly liable to any of the growers, customers of ChemlImpex,
who may have been harmed by the nonconforming nature ofthe pesticides.
Under previous Chinese contract law, the answer was no.45 It appears that
even under the new UCL, third party beneficiaries do not have rights under
the contract. 46 This interpretation of the UCL as lacking third party
beneficiary rights is buttressed by the statements of at least one of the law's
drafters.47

41. See UCL, supra note 11, art. 1. Recall that China's principal motivation for developing
the earlier contract laws was to better run the centrally-planned economy. By removal of the term
"economic" from parties competent to contract, the NPC may have been trying to bolster the
UCL's image as a true contract law in the international sense "formulated in order to protect the
lawful rights and interests of contract parties." Id. However, the UCL also states that in addition
to protecting legal rights, its purpose is to "safeguard social and economic order, and to promote
socialist modernization." Id.
42. See generally Wang Xuanjun, supra note 14 (explaining how freedom to contract was
a continuing theme in the drafting of the UCL).
43. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302 (1981); E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH &
WILLIAM F. YOUNG, CONTRACTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 863-64 (5th ed. 1995) (introducing third
party beneficiary concepts).
44. See Wang Liming, supra note 17, at 361. Wang explains that under the Chinese civil
law concept of "contract relativity," contracts are viewed as only effective between the parties
which have effected them. See id. at 358-59.
45. See id. at 357.
46. See UCL, supra note 11, arts. 64-65. Article 64 states: "Where the parties prescribed
that the obligor render performance to a third person, if the obligor fails to render its performance
to the third person, or rendered non-conforming performance, it shall be liable to the obligee for
breach of contract." Id. Article 65 states: "Where the parties prescribed that a third person render
performance to the obligee, if the third person fails to perform or rendered non-conforming
performance, the obligor shall be liable to the obligee for breach of contract." Id.
47. See Wang Liming, supra note 17, at 361 (explaining that the author Wang is a member
of the Chinese legislature (NPC) which drafted the UCL).
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III. FORMATION OF CONTRACT

Article Seven of the FECL provided that "[a] contract is formed when
the clauses of contract are agreed in written form and signed by the
parties." '48 The ECL allowed some oral contracts and the UCL liberalizes
the writing requirement even more.49 The UCL specifically states that "[a]
contract may be made in a writing, in an oral conversation, as well as in any
other form.""° Removing the writing requirement also brings the UCL more
in line with the CISG and UCC.5" Doing away with formalisms such as
writing also contributes to the overall freedom to contract.52
Under Article Seven of the FECL, when one party requests to sign a
confirmation letter, then the contract is formed only upon the signing of the
confirmation letter." Perhaps this was a uniquely Chinese way of trying to
win the "Battle of the Forms."54 However, the new UCL abandons this
approach, and simply states that "[a] contract is concluded by the exchange
of an offer and an acceptance."55 This is apparently a completely new
concept to Chinese law. 56 This offer-acceptance method of contract
formation is probably also the single most significant advancement in terms

48. FECL, supra note 7, art. 7.
49. See ECL, supra note 4, art. 3.
50. UCL, supra note 11, art. 10 (explaining that any form may be used, but that certain
types of contracts shall be in writing if a relevant law or administrative regulation so requires).
5I. See U.C.C. § 2-201 (1978) (discussing the need for a writing requirement only to satisfy
the Statute of Frauds); CISG, supranote 20, art. 11.In addition, such a writing requirement was
commonplace in the practices of the Soviet Union and other Eastern European nations from which
China derived early Communist inspirations. See McLean & Zhang, supranote 2, at 135.
52. See Jiang, supra note 6, at 249.
53. See FECL, supra note 7, art. 7 (stating that "in case one party requests to sign a
confirmation letter when the agreement is reached by the means of letter, telegram or telex, the
contract is only formed upon the confirmation letter being signed"). Perhaps the only effect of this
FECL provision is to make explicit what could otherwise be reasonably implied from the offeracceptance formation mechanism in both the CISG and UCC. If one party unambiguously indicates
his intent not to be bound until a confirmation letter is signed, then that signature might be looked
at as either a condition precedent to the contract's becoming effective or as proof that a purported
acceptance was not an acceptance at all. See CISG, supra note 20, art. 18 (dealing with intent);
see also U.C.C. § 2-206 (expressing that an unambiguous indication to the contrary will defeat
what would otherwise be determined an acceptance).
54. "The Battle of the Forms" is the result of each side using its standard form contracts
which contain terms different than those of the other contracting party (boilerplate language). See
FARNSWORTH, supra note 43, at 161. During the course of contract negotiations, the parties may
not pay much attention to these differences. See id. But when a breach occurs and the parties go
back and look at all the documentation which makes up the "contract," it may be difficult to tell
which terms actually apply.
55. See UCL, supra note 11, art. 13. In addition, Article 25 states: "a contract is formed once
the acceptance becomes effective." Id. art. 25.
56. See Pan, supra note 22, at 2.
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The provision dealing with the classical acceptance varying offer (the
root of the last-shot problem) in the new UCL is worded almost identically
to that of the CISG, and therefore one could expect the same sort of
problems to arise under both. 8
IV.

INVALID CONTRACTS

Under the FECL, contracts which violate the public policy, interest, or
law of the PRC or are concluded by means of fraud or duress are invalid.59
One Chinese scholar believes that these concepts readily find their parallels
in the common law concepts of unconscionability. 60 These concepts are

carried over in the new UCL as well. 6 ' The notion of invalidating contracts
based on public policy is not foreign to American law. 62 However, given the
PRC government's broad interpretation of "public policy," contracts have
the potential to be invalidated on grounds much more varied than those
imagined in our American tradition.63

Article 52 of the UCL states, "A contract is invalid in any of the
following circumstances... (iv) The contract harms public interests; (v)

The contract violates a mandatory provision of any law or administrative
regulation."' In the PRC, the State Council and the State Planning
Commission set general guidelines and priorities for a five-year period.65

57. See Jiang, supra note 6, at 249.
58. See UCL, supra note 11, arts. 30-31; CISG, supra note 20, art. 19; see also FOLSOM ET
AL., supra note 26, at 80-98 (explaining the functioning of the "last shot doctrine" under the CISG
and under the UCC). Under neither the CISG nor the UCC is there any language a lawyer can
include which would ensure that his terms would "win" under the "Battle of the Forms." See id.
at 84. It is the author's belief that the UCL presents the same situation.
59. See FECL, supra note 7, arts. 9, 10.
60. See ZHENG, supra note 8, at 65.
61. See UCL, supra note 11, art. 52. In fact, the first three enumerated items of Article 52
read like a codification of the Common Law of unconscionability, however, notice the emphasis
on harming the state:
[A] contract is invalid in any of the following circumstances: (i) One party
induced conclusion of the contract through fraud or duress, thereby harming the
interests of the state; (ii) The parties colluded in bad faith, thereby harming the
interests of the state, the collective or any third party; (iii) The parties intended
to conceal an illegal purpose under the guise of a legitimate transaction.
Id.
62. See FARNSWORTH & YOUNG, supra note 43, at 346-47 (discussing various public policy
arguments that affect contractual relations).
63. See Rubenstein, supra note 5, at 516-17.
64. UCL, supra note 11, art. 52.
65. See Grow, supra note 13, at 169.
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The resulting "Five Year Plan" is used by the authorities in Beijing to set
out national priorities and to "influence the nature and pace of economic
development" by determining, in part, how scarce resources should be
allocated."
Because Article 52 focuses on "harming the interests of the state" and
harming "public interest," a strong case could be made that if the subject
matter of the contract were not in conformance with the priorities laid forth
in the Five Year Plan, it would be more likely that the contract would be
invalidated.67 However, current thinking is that the Five Year Plan is
becoming less and less influential as the PRC continues to move towards
a market economy.6" At least one author feels that conflicts with the Five
Year Plan still provide opportunity for invalidation of contracts.69 At any
rate, Rohm & Haas should verify the priority of agricultural production
(which would seem to include pesticides) in the current Five Year Plan.
Moreover, the same scholar goes on to explain that the FECL contained
nothing similar to the common law concept of voidability of contract.7 ° This
lack of voidability of contract was a remnant of the planned economy
mentality of the FECL drafters. 7' The UCL changes this by adding explicit
provisions for voidability based on limited capacity (age) and unauthorized
agent.72 In either case, the UCL states that upon demand, the principal must
ratify the contract within one month, thereby precluding him from later
declaring the contract voided based on age or unauthorized agent.73
Since under the new UCL, the contract may be voided if the signing
agent had inadequate authority, Rohm & Haas will want to ensure that the
Chinese agent with whom it deals has appropriate authority to enter into a
contract. Many Chinese entities, especially formerly state-owned entities
entail complicated bureaucracies. These bureaucratic webs make it difficult
to discern whether the person purporting to be the authorized agent has
adequate authorization to contract on behalf of the company.74

66. Id.
67. UCL, supra note 11, art. 52.
68. See Wang Liming, supra note 17, at 356-58 (explaining how references to the Five Year
Plan were removed from the ECL in 1993 amendments).
69. See Rubenstein, supra note 5, at 516-17 (discussing how the removal of overt references
in the domestic contract law arguably did not diminish the ability of Chinese courts to invalidate

contracts in conflict with the state plan).
70. See ZHENG, supra note 8, at 65 (explaining that while the FECL contains nothing like

the common law concept of voidability, this concept is incorporated by virtue of the Chinese Civil
Code).
71. See Jiang, supra note 6, at 249.
72. See UCL, supra note 11, arts. 47-48.
73. See id.

74. See Pan, supra note 22, at 2.
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If Rohm & Haas were to have doubts after the conclusion of the
contract as to the Chinese party's agent's capacity to contract, it should
avail itself of the UCL's provision which allows it to demand that the other
party's principal ratify the contract within one month. 5 If upon demand,
ChemImpex were not to ratify within one month, the contract would be
deemed canceled.76 In fact, at any time prior to ratification, Rohm & Haas
would be entitled "in good faith" to cancel the contract." This could
potentially lead to problems were Rohm & Haas to receive credible, but
erroneous, information that the Chinese party did not have appropriate
authority to contract.
Rohm & Haas could "in good faith" cancel the contract based on this
information, which later turned out to be erroneous, and therefore miss its
delivery deadline. The UCL seems to indicate that Rohm & Haas would
have been within their rights to cancel under such circumstances. 78 The
decision whether to cancel once suspicion arises or to demand ratification
could be driven by such things as the nearness of the delivery date and the
availability of other buyers, subject to the "good faith" provision.79
The UCL also adds the concept of "apparent authority" to Chinese
contract law.80 Notwithstanding the above discussion, even if the agent did
not have proper authorization to contract on behalf of the principal, his act
is still valid so long as it was reasonable for the other party to believe that
he had such authority."' This should give Rohm & Haas some cause for
relief so long as it was reasonable for them to believe that the Chinese
representative had authority to act on behalf of Chemlmpex. The term
"reasonable" is still open to much interpretation. Therefore, Rohm & Haas
should still avail itself of the mandatory ratification procedures outlined
above if it should have doubts as to the scope of the other side's authority
to contract on behalf of Chemlmpex.

75. See UCL, supra note 11, art. 48.
76. See id.
77. See id.
78. See id. Perhaps, an erroneous cancellation sanctioned by the UCL is not as serious a
problem because Article 48 does require that "[cjancellation shall be effected by notification." Id.
Since under the UCL, cancellation is not effective until notification, one would assume that when
Rohm & Haas contacts Chemlmpex to inform it that Rohm & Haas is canceling the contract,
Chemlmpex' principal would quickly ratify. See id.
79. See id.The "good faith" requirement would no doubt preclude Rohm & Haas' canceling
the contract on the pretext of suspected unauthorized agent for the purpose of getting a better deal
somewhere else in the market.
80. See Pan, supra note 22, at 2.
81. See UCL, supra note 11, art. 49.
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V. PERFORMANCE OF CONTRACT

In the United States, contract law emphasizes that either performance
or damages are satisfactory, so long as the damages put one into the same
position in which one would have been had the contract been fully
performed. 2 In the PRC during. the era of strict central planning, because
contracts were viewed more as administrative orders, a party could be
ordered to "perform specifically what he had 'agreed' to do, no matter how
impractical or costly." 3
Against the backdrop of super specific performance, the FECL
emphasized that contracts were legally binding and should (English version)
be performed.' Interestingly enough, the English version of the UCL
stated: "The parties shall fully perform their respective obligations.... ."8'
The English translation of the FECL employed "should" 6 and that of the
UCL employs "shall."" But, the Chinese versions of both laws employ the
same term, which is probably best translated as the English "should. 88
Moreover, this is not the first time in Chinese contract law that this
should/shall ambiguity has arisen.89 Therefore, this change in terminology
in the English version is not strong evidence that the new law signals a shift
to an even stricter view of specific performance. Rather, it is simply
inconsistent translation.
Some authors believe that the drafters of the FECL intended
performance to be mandatory, and since the same language is carried over
in the UCL, presumably, performance would still be mandatory.9" At the
very least, the express language of the UCL indicates that a party has a
right to specific performance except in limited circumstance.9 '

82. See FARNSWORTH & YOUNG, supra note 43, at 483.
83. Rubenstein, supra note 5, at 518.
84. See FECL, supra note 7, art. 16.
85. See UCL, supra note 11, art. 60.
86. See FECL, supra note 7, art. 16.
87. See UCL, supra note 1i, art. 60.
88. The term "yingdang" in common usage is most closely translated as "should." See
YUANDONG GuoYu CIDIAN 355 (Yuandong Tushu Co. 1992) [hereinafter CIDIAN]. However, the
UCL does employ the term "yingdang" in certain areas where it could only possibly mean "shall."
See UCL, supra note 11, art. 86.
89. See Rubenstein, supra note 5, at 519.
90. See McLean & Zhang, supra note 2, at 136.
91. See UCL, supra note 11, art. 110. Article I10 states:
Where a party fails to perform, or rendered non-conforming performance of, a
non-monetary obligation, the other party may require performance, except where:
(i) performance is impossible in law or in fact;
(ii) the subject matter of the obligation does not lend itself to enforcement by
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This requirement or at least preference for specific performance could
be problematic for Rohm & Haas if Chemlmpex were to demand that
conforming pesticide be shipped immediately. Although the UCL does not
performance if it is "impossible" or if its cost would be
allow for specific
"excessive, ' ' 92 these terms are open to wide interpretation. The problem
gets even more complicated for Rohm & Haas if it turns out that it cannot
manufacture the type of pesticide required.
The FECL like the UCC provided for a right to adequate assurance of
performance if faced with the prospect that the other party would not
perform. 93 The FECL required the suspending party to have "conclusive
evidence" that the other party could not perform his obligations before the
right to demand assurances was triggered.94 It also provided that upon the
prospective breacher's providing of"a full guarantee of performance," the
party shall perform the contract. 95 However, the FECL failed to offer
clarification as to what constituted "conclusive evidence" or "guarantee of
performance."9'
In terms of when a party may suspend performance, the UCL retains
essentially the same language as the FECL, except that it improves upon the
FECL by adding a laundry list of factors to look at in determining the other
party's inability to perform. 97 In addition, the FECL required a "full
guarantee of performance" 98 whereas the UCL perhaps requires less of a
guarantee, only requiring an "appropriate" assurance." Although the three
specific performance or the cost of performance is excessive;
(iii) the obligee does not require performance within a reasonable time.
Id.
92. See id.
93. See Rubenstein, supranote 5, at 520.
94. See FECL, supra note 7, art. 17; see also U.C.C. § 2-609 (1978) (requiring a
"reasonable grounds for insecurity [to] arise").
95. FECL, supra note 7, art. 17.
96. See ZHENG, supra note 8, at 65. Although the UCC does not define its terms in this
respect either, at least the comments to the UCC define and give examples of these terms. The
author was unable to find a similar Chinese interpretive guide for the FECL.
97. See UCL, supra note 1i,art. 68. Article 68 lists the following factors:
(i) [i]ts business has seriously deteriorated;
(ii) [i]t has engaged in transfer of assets or withdrawal of funds for the purpose
of evading debts;
has lost its business creditworthiness;
(iii) [i]t
(iv) [i]t is in any other circumstance which will or may cause it to lose its ability
to perform.
Id.
98. See FECL, supra note 7, art. 17 ("Chongfen baozheng").
99. See UCL, supra note 1I,arts. 68, 69 ("Shidang danbao").
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employ slightly different terms, the UCL is more in line with the CISG
because both contain an enumeration of specific examples giving rise to the
right to demand assurance." However,the language in the three appears
to be equally elastic.'0 '
Article 68 of the UCL states that the "party required to perform first
may suspend its performance if it has conclusive evidence establishing that
the other party... is in any... circumstance which will or may cause it to
lose ability to perform."' 1 2 In the hypothetical, Rohm & Haas has delivered
non-conforming pesticides. Perhaps this single delivery of non-conforming
goods is not "conclusive evidence" that Rohin & Haas has "lost its ability
to perform." But, if Chemlmpex also had other information, such as that
Rohim & Haas is incapable of producing conforming pesticide for some
reason, the quantum of evidence may be sufficient to be deemed
"conclusive evidence." As to future deliveries of the pesticide, Chemlmpex
would probably have a right to suspend its performance (payment) and
demand assurances of conforming performance from Roim & Haas. Rohm
& Haas should be aware of this provision and be prepared to respond with
appropriate assurances of performance.
The FECL did not specifically allow for suspension in the case of a
"clear repudiation" (whereby a party expressly says that it will not
perform). The UCL, however, does allow expressly for termination when
faced with a clear repudiation. 3 The notion of "clear repudiation" as it
relates to "anticipatory breach" will be discussed in section VI. Under the
FECL, if Rohi & Haas were to come right out and say "we will not
perform," Chemlmpex would find no specific authority to suspend
performance at that point. The UCL clearly states that Chemlmpex would
be justified in suspending based on such a statement."' However, even
without this specific provision for "clear repudiation," it would seem that
such a repudiating statement should have satisfied the "conclusive
evidence" standard giving rise to suspension under both the FECL and the
UCL.
The UCL goes beyond the FECL (which only dealt with suspension of
performance) and actually provides specifically for termination of
contractual obligations.0 5 Continuing with the hypothetical, under the

100. See CISG,supra note 20, art. 71.
101. See generally CISG,supra note 20; FECL, supra note 7; UCL, supranote 11. "Elastic
language" is language subject to multiple interpretations. See FOLSOM ET AL., supra note 26, at
80-98 (discussing elasticity of language in the last-shot doctrine context).
102. UCL, supra note 11, art. 68.
103. See UCL, supra note 11, art. 94(ii); see also Rubenstein, supra note 5, at 520
(discussing the FECL's lack of a provision for "clear repudiation").
104. See UCL, supra note 11, art. 94(ii).
105. See id.
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FECL, it would not have been clear whether ChemImpex could terminate
its performance (the subsequent payments) or whether it could just
continually suspend performance while awaiting assurances. This is because
the FECL did not expressly provide for termination whereas it did provide
for suspension of performance. The UCL now provides explicit authority
to terminate if adequate assurances are not forthcoming. Therefore, if
adequate assurances, it may be faced with
Rohm & Haas does not provide
106
termination of the contract.
VI. BREACH

AND DAMAGES

Article 19 of the FECL was more or less a codification of the common
law rule of consequential damages first announced in Hadley v.
Baxendale.'°7 Article 113 of the UCL maintains this standard.' In the
hypothetical, based on whether the damages to Chinese crops were
foreseeable to Rohm & Haas, consequential damages could prove quite
extensive." 9 But recall here that the UCL does not allow for Third Party
Beneficiaries to sue on the contract," 0 therefore only ChemImpex would
have an action against Rohm & Haas."I
The FECL did not seem to allow for punitive damages, and nothing in
the UCL changes that position. 1 ' This was arguably not the position taken
in the domestic ECL." 3 Like the FECL, the UCL allows for liquidated

106. As stated earlier, this note focuses on the General Principles section of the UCL which
deals specifically with the fundamentals applicable to contracts generally. Since here, the
hypothetical deals specifically with a termination during a sales contract, specific articles of the
UCL "Specific Provisions" dealing just with the particulars of sales contracts would also need to
be addressed. See UCL, supra note 11, arts. 130-175; see also supra text accompanying note 31.
Articles 165 and 166 deal specifically with termination during contracts calling for delivery in
installments. See UCL, supra note 11, arts. 165-166.
107. 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Ex. 1854). See FECL, supra note 7, art. 19 "The liability for
damages by a party for breach of contract should be equal to the loss suffered by the other party
as a consequence of the breach. However, such damages may not exceed the loss which the party
in breach ought to have foreseen at the time of the conclusion of the contract as a possible
consequence of the breach of contract.").
108. See UCL, supra note 11, art. 113.
109. "The rule of Hadley v. Baxendale is an attempt to restrict the promisor's liability for
breach of promise to those consequences, the risk of which he knew about, or must be taken to
have known about, when he made the contract." FARNSWORTH & Young, supra note 43, at 538.
This is why it is significant in the hypothetical that Rohm & Haas was aware that the crops would
be damaged if the pesticides were non-conforming.
110. See Wang Liming, supra note 17, at 361; see also supra text accompanying note 44.
!1I. The individual farmers in privity with Chemlmpex would have a claim against
Chemlmpex and ChemImpex would no doubt include their claims as damages due from Rohm &
Haas for breach of the contract.
112. See ZHENG, supra note 8, at 66.
113. See Wang Jun, Symposium: Is the UCC Dead, or Alive and Well? International
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damages, but under both of these laws, the liquidated damages are to serve
a strictly compensatory function." 4 Both Chinese laws make clear that if in
actuality the liquidated damages do not generally reflect actual damages, a
party may petition the courts or arbitral bodies to reform the liquidated
damages to more closely conform with actual damages."' Limiting the
parties' ability to contract for liquidated damages seems counter to the
general trend in the UCL of increasing freedom of contract. Note however
that the UCC also reflects that liquidated damages should reasonably reflect
anticipated damages." 6
Suppose that in the hypothetical, the contract had provided for a
liquidated damages clause under which Rohm & Haas would have to pay
Chemlmpex two times the price of all non-conforming pesticide. Assume
that this amount equaled $2.4 million, yet the actual damages to
Chemlmpex were only $1 million. Under the UCL, Rohm & Haas could
petition the courts, or more likely the arbitral body, for a reduction of the
to $1 million. Such a request should be granted under
liquidated damages
7
the UCL.'
Unlike the FECL, the UCL provides for anticipatory breach and should
look familiar to a Common Law lawyer."' Article 108 states: "Where one
party expressly states or indicates by its conduct that it will not perform its
obligations under a contract, the other party may hold it liable for breach

Perspectives: Punitive and Compensatory ContractDamages: A Comparative Study of UCC,
Chinese, andInternationalLaw, 29 LOY.L.A. L. REV. 1071, 1082 (1996) (indicating that punitive
damages are available in the domestic ECL, probably under the notion that since "the planned
economic system still plays an important role in the country's national economy ...[punitive
damages are] the most effective way to prevent breach of economic contracts and ensure the
completion of scheduled economic plans ....). Consider also that since the UCL replaces the ECL
in domestic-domestic contractual relations, the absence of punitive damages for contract in this new
"domestic law" probably reflects China's continued shift away from a non-market economy.
114. See FECL, supra note 7, art. 20; UCL, supra note 11, art. 114.
Where the amount of liquidated damages prescribed is below the loss resulting
from the breach, a party may petition the People's Court or an arbitration
institution to increase the amount; where the amount of liquidated damages
prescribed exceeds the loss resulting from the breach, a party may petition the
People's Court or an arbitration institution to decrease the amount as appropriate.
UCL, supra note 11, art. 114.
115. See FECL, supra note 7, art. 20; UCL, supra note 11, art. 114.
116. See U.C.C. § 2-718 (1978). Whereas the UCL explicitly states that if the liquidated
damages do not accurately reflect actual damages, a readjustment will be forced, the UCC seems
to be a little more permissive on the subject, requiring only that liquidated damages be set "at an
amount which is reasonablein the light of the anticipated or actual harm. "(emphasis added). Id.
117. See UCL, supra note 11, art. 114.
118. See id.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol12/iss3/3

16

Law of the People's Republic of China: First Com
UNIFORM CONTRACT LA WIN CHINA
1998-20001Gregory: Uniform Contract

of contract before the time of performance."" 9 The significance of this
article to Chemlmpex should be readily apparent. IfChemlmpex could not
claim anticipatory breach, then it would have to wait until the end of the
period for performance (the full five years) before it could claim damages
on the breach of the entire contract. 2 In addition, it would probably be
required to sue separately as each individual performance became due.
Article 108 makes clear that Chemlmpex may sue for the entire breach once
Rohm & Haas makes it clear through their conduct that they will not
perform the contract.
VII. ASSIGNMENT AND DELEGATION

Under the FECL, agreement by all the parties to a contract seemed to
be a prerequisite to assigning rights or duties under the contract. 2 ' Under
the FECL, it was unclear whether the phrase "consent should be obtained"
made consent obligatory or merely permissive. 22
' The "should" here in the
English translation was the same Chinese term that is translated as both
"should" and "shall" in other places throughout the text.'23 In addition,
Article 27 of the FECL provided that permission be obtained from
competent government authority in order to assign certain types of
contracts, particularly those
contracts for which official approval was a
24
prerequisite to formation. 1

The UCL is more permissive in the area of assignment of rights. The
UCL, rather than giving a negative mandate on assignment of rights, frames
the rule as generally permissive: "The obligee may assign its rights under a
contract... except where such assignment is prohibited. 'l' 2S Notably absent
is any requirement to get consent to assign rights from the other party to
the contract. The UCL, however, has not changed the previous position

119. See UCL, supra note 11, art. 108.
120. Since this is a sales contract, Article 166 would be applicable. See UCL, supranote 11,
art. 166; see also supra text accompanying notes 3 1, 10 1. Article 166 would allow for termination
of the contract if this non-conforming delivery were to "frustrate the purpose" of the contract even
without resort to anticipatory breach. See UCL, supra note 11, art. 166.
121. See FECL, supra note 7, art. 26. The English version translates as "consent should be

obtained from the other party." Indeed the Chinese version also uses the term "yingdang" which
probably best translates as "should." However, despite this permissive "should," the authorities

have interpreted this as an imperative that permission must be obtained. "The Foreign Economic
Contract Law provides that the assignment of contract rights and obligations is subject to

agreement by all parties to a contract." ZHENG, supra note 8, at 66.
122. McLean & Zhang, supra note 2, at 139.
123. See CIDIAN, supra note 88, at 355 (explaining situation with "Yingdang").

124. See FECL, supra note 7, art. 27.
125. UCL, supra note 11, art. 79 (enumerating three things as prohibiting assignment: (1)the
nature of the contract, (2) agreement between the parties, (3) applicable law).
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requiring consent from the other side to assign duties under the contract.

26

In addition, the UCL seems to maintain the same position as the FECL as
27 Among contracts requiring
dealing with joint ventures. 28
contracts
are
official government approval
In the hypothetical, if Rohm & Haas wanted to transfer their rights in
the contract to another party, and the FECL governed, they would probably
(depending on the judicial determination of the word "should") have to
obtain the consent of Chemlmpex to do so. However, under the UCL, it is
clear that Rohm & Haas could transfer their rights in the contract to
another party, so long as such a transfer were not precluded by the contract
itself or by law. Be mindful though that Rohm & Haas would still need the

to contracts requiring official approval.

consent of Chemlmpex to assign their obligations or duties under the

contract. Under either contract law, if Chemlmpex had been ajoint venture
entity, Rohm & Haas would need to get the permission of the appropriate
Chinese authority in order to assign rights or duties.
VIII.

DISPUTE SETTLEMENT

All of the various forms of Chinese contract law, and the GPCL put a
great emphasis on arbitration rather thanjudicial settlement of disputes. The
FECL, while allowing resort to the judicial system, was especially
suggestive to the fact that arbitration is preferred and judicial proceedings
should be an absolute last resort.'2 9 The new UCL retains this preference
for arbitration, and like the FECL, allows resort to the courts if all else
fails. 3 In fact, both the FECL and the UCL require that parties arbitrate if
126. See UCL, supra note 11, art. 84.
127. See UCL, supra note 11, art. 87. This article merely states the obvious that if this
particular kind of contract by law or regulation requires official permission prior to reassignment,
then the law or regulation must be followed. It is in much more generic terms than article 27 of
the FECL. See id.; FECL, supra note 7, art. 27.
128. See McLean & Zhang, supra note 2, at 139.
129. See FECL, supra note 7, arts. 37, 38. Article 37 reads as follows:
Any disputes arising from a contract ought to be settled by the parties, if
possible, through consultations or mediation of a third party. In case the parties
are unwilling to solve a dispute through consultation or mediation, orfail to do
so, the dispute may, in accordance with the arbitration clause provided in the
contract or the written arbitration agreement reached by the parties afterwards,
be submitted to a Chinese arbitration body or other arbitration body.
FECL, supra note 7, art. 37 (emphasis added). Article 38 reads "Ji]n case neither an arbitration
clause is provided in the contract nor a written arbitration agreement is reached afterwards, the
parties may bring suit in the People's Court." FECL, supra note 7, art. 38 (emphasis added).
130. See UCL, supra note !1, art. 128. Although when discussing last resort to the courts,
both the FECL and the UCL refer only to the "People's Courts" (the courts of the PRC), there is
some evidence that since both the FECL and the UCL state that parties may bring suit in the
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an arbitration clause exists in the contract.131
The literal language of the UCL seems to direct that if the parties had
an arbitration clause in the contract, whether or not both parties
subsequently agreed at the time of conflict to go before the courts rather
than arbitrate, the UCL would still require the parties to arbitrate. Despite
this literal language, the author has been assured by friends in the Chinese
legal community, that this in not the case. Rather, if both parties agree, they
may opt out of the arbitration clause at the time conflict actually arises.
IX. EXCUSE OF PERFORMANCE
Article 29 of the FECL listed the major provisions which give rise to
cancellation of contract as: (1) serious breach, (2) failure to perform within
a grace period,
(3) force majeure, and (4) the occurrence of agreed upon
32
conditions. 1
According to one author, the FECL's failure to define "serious
breach"' 33 could possiblyrender many more contracts avoidable under the
FECL than under the CISG with its internationally-recognized terms like
"fundamental [breach]" and "foreseeability."' 3 4 Under the UCL, this
situation appears to have improved. The UCL does not use the undefined
term "serious breach," but rather provides that a breach which leads to
"frustration of purpose" is a grounds for termination. 35 While the notion
of frustration of purpose is by no means a concept with a single concrete
meaning, it is at least a familiar term in international contract parlance. 136
Based on the delivery of pesticides completely worthless for their stated
purpose in the contract, ChemImpex could probably claim that the purpose
People's Courts, then the use of"may" indicates that the parties may also apply to foreign courts.
See id.; FECL, supra note 7, art. 38; ZHENG, supra note 8, at 67.
131. See UCL, supra note 11, art. 128; FECL, supra note 7, art. 37; see also Victor Perez,
Note: From Open Markets to Closed Courts: The Resolution ofJoint Venture ContractDisputes

Through Arbitration in China, 12 FLA. J.INT'L L. 491 (1998-2000) (giving a broad overview of
the state of arbitration in China).
132. See Shen, supra note 26, at 38; FECL, supra note 7, art. 29.
133. The term "serious breach" refers to the phrase "[t]he expected economic interests are
infringed seriously for the breach of the contract by the other party." "Lingyifang weifan [breach]
hetong, yizhiyanzhong [seriously] yingxiang dingli hetong suo qiwang dejingji liyi." FECL, supra
note 7, art. 29 (emphasis added).
134. See Shen, supra note 26, at 40; FECL, supra note 7, art. 29; CISG, supra note 20, art.
25.
135. See UCL, supra note 11, art. 94(iv). The Chinese language from which the translators
derived "frustrates the purpose" is literally translated as "cannot achieve the objective [bu neng
shixian mudi]." Under this language, one must speculate whether a Chinese court would or even
should constrain itself to the Common Law or developing international doctrines of frustration of
purpose.
136. See generally FOLSOM ET AL., supra note 26 (discussing frustration of purpose in the
international context with case illustrations).
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of the contract had been frustrated. As such, ChemImpex's further
performance would be excused under the UCL's "frustration of purpose"
language.
ChemImpex would certainly like to know if it will be given a grace
period under which to deliver conforming pesticide. The UCL retains in
very similar language the FECL's provision regarding failure to perform
within a grace period.' 37 At first glance, the UCL seems to carry over from
the FECL the ambiguity of whether it is mandatory or permissive (as in the
CISG) 3 s to give the breaching party a grace period, only after the
expiration of which, the right to terminate arises.'39 However, the UCL
adds an additional provision which seems to make it reasonably clear that
the granting of an additional grace period is optional. 4 In making the grace
period optional, the drafters further bolstered freedom of contract. Under
the UCL, if a party desires a grace period in case of a breach, that party will
have to contract for it at the outset.
Therefore, it appears that under the FECL, it is more likely that
ChemImpex would have to give Rohm & Haas a grace period during which
to perform. However now under the UCL, it is at ChemImpex' discretion
whether to give such a grace period. Rohm & Haas' lawyers should have
been aware of this provision and contracted at the outset for a grace period
in the event of such problems.
Recall that under the FECL, while there was clear provision for
suspension of the contract if faced with nonperformance, there was no
explicit provision for termination. One Chinese author pointed out that a
key similarity between the relevant provisions of the FECL and the CISG
was that "the party seeking to avoid the contract does not have to prove the
'4
seriousness and effects of the breach.' 1
The UCL clarifies this situation by only allowing a party to suspend
performance if the other party breaches its "main obligations" as compared
to "any breach" in Article 49 of the CISG. 42 Just based on the plain text,

137. See UCL, supra note 11, art. 94(iii); FECL supra note 7, art. 29(2).
138. See CISG, supra note 20, arts. 47(1), 63(1).
139. See Shen, supra note 26, at 40-41 (explaining that article 29 of the FECL has been
interpreted in both ways). The language in Article 94(iii) of the UCL is nearly identical to that of
the FECL, except it uses the term "main obligations." Article 94 states: "[t]he other party delayed
performance of its main obligations, and failed to perform within a reasonable time after receiving
demand for performance" UCL, supra note 11, art. 94(iii).
140. See UCL, supra note 11, art. 94(iv) ("[tihe parties may terminate a contract if... the
other party delayed performance or otherwise breached the contract, thereby frustrating the
purpose of the contract"). Since this provision does not specify what degree of breach is required,
it would seem that this provision could override the "main obligation" language in the "delayed
performance" provision discussed later.
141. Shen, supranote 26, at 40.
142. See CISG, supra note 20, art. 49(2)(b); UCL, supra note 11, art. 94(iii).
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a breach of a "main obligation" seems more serious than a mere "breach,"
and therefore may not allow a party to suspend performance under as many
circumstances. Perhaps raising the level of proof required to suspend
performance of contracts under the UCL is congruent with the fact that the
UCL now specifically provides for termination of the contract. Since under
the FECL, it was not clear when suspension could become termination, it
is possible that the lower level of proof helped to ease the transition to
termination.
It appears that generally, Chinese doctrine interprets force majeure
narrowly.'43 Both the FECL and the UCL define Force Majeure as "any
objective circumstance which is unforeseeable, unavoidable and
insurmountable."'" The FECL provided a stipulation that parties could
themselves define an event of force majeure, although this seemed odd in
light of the requirement that an event of force majeure be unforeseeable. 4 '
It is difficult to see what such a stipulation would add to the contract that
a simple condition subsequent discharging contractual obligations would
not.'4 6 Presumably, this may be the reason that the UCL no longer allows
parties to stipulate force majeure events.' 47 While the force majeure
provision of the FECL accounted for the common law concept of
impossibility of performance, it did not seem to entail frustration of
purpose.'48 The UCL provision now entails frustration of purpose.'4 9
Retaining the force majeure provision of the FECL in the UCL leaves
open several questions, such as what kind of event qualifies as
unforeseeable, unavoidable, and unsurmountable. It is unclear whether the

143. See Lester Ross, Force Majeure and Related Doctrines of Excuse in ContractLaw of
the People 's Republic of China, 5 J. CHINESE L. 58,60 (1991).
144. See UCL, supra note 11, art. 117.
145. See FECL, supranote 7, art. 24; Ross, supra note 143, at 80 ("This may enable a party
to invoke force majeure even for an event that is not stipulated in the force majeure clause...
on the grounds that the actual event is analogous to [a stipulated event]; ... that the parties would
have stipulated the event but were incapable of doing so because of its inherent
unforeseeability.").
146. In fact, Article 93 of the UCL provides: "The parties may prescribe a condition under
which one party is entitled to terminate the contract. Upon satisfaction of the condition for
termination of the contract, the party with the termination right may terminate the contract." UCL,
supra note 11, art. 93. Presumably, one party could write into the contract a condition that the
party may terminate the contract in the event of certain labor problems, or some other event which
might not necessarily fall within the more narrow category of force majeure.
147. See generally UCL, supra note I I (lacking any specific provision allowing parties to
stipulate which events will constitute force majeure events).
148. See UCL, supra note 11, art. 117.
149. See Ross, supra note 143, at 81. Although Ross focused on the FECL, the similarity of
the FECL force majeure provision with that of the UCL allows his analysis in this respect to apply
to the UCL as well. The UCL specifically states that "[t]he parties may terminate a contract if...
force majeure frustrated the purpose of the contract." UCL, supra note 1I,art. 94(i).
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PRC government's interference with the Contract under the auspices of the

"Five Year Plan" would count as a force maj eure. ' ° At least one author has

noted that in the days when Chinese contract law specifically allowed for
changes in the contract due to changes in the state plan, courts frequently
invoked the state plan in making such changes.' Now that the UCL no
longer makes specific reference to the state plan, it is unclear whether force
majeure doctrine will allow parties to change the contract based on changes
in the state plan.' At any rate, "[j]udicial discretion generated by
ambiguity in the doctrine of force majeure
may allow the state to pick and
51 3
choose when performance is required."'
In the hypothetical, if a new Five Year Plan emerged in which
agriculture (and therefore pesticides) no longer commanded great
importance in the Central Plan, would the Chinese government's
reallocation of shipping assets constitute force majeure? Recall that in the
hypothetical, the shipping company is a state-owned entity. When Rohm &
Haas goes to deliver the pesticides at the port to Shipper, and Shipper is
nowhere to be found, Chemlmpex might claim that it is excused from
further performance based on the force majeure of the change in the Five
Year Plan. If the change in the Five Year Plan which lead to the reallocation
of shipping assets is deemed force majeure, Chemlmpex will be excused.
This is the type of contingency which Rohm & Haas should specifically
anticipate in the contract.
The UCL also carries over the concept of simultaneous breach from the
FECL, a concept wholly-foreign to U. S. Law. 4 Article 121 of the FECL
states that "[i]n a case where both parties are in breach of the contract, each
shall bear corresponding liabilities respectively." 5 ' The UCL's equivalent
passage reads, "In case of bilateral breach, the parties shall assume their
respective liabilities."' 56 Despite this apparent difference in wording, the
Chinese version of the two articles is exactly the same, and therefore it is
safe to assume that the NPC did not intend to change the pre-UCL concept
of simultaneous breach. United States contract law recognizes an order of
performance and therefore precludes the notion of simultaneous breach. 57
'
Lawyers for Rohm & Haas would need to be aware of this concept and be

150. See Ross, supra note 143, at 83.
151. See Rubenstein, supra note 5, at 522.
152. See id.
153. Id.

154. See FECL, supranote 7, art. 21; UCL, supranote 11, art. 120; McLean & Zhang, supra
note 2, at 137.
155. FECL, supra note 7, art. 21.
156. UCL, supra note 11, art. 120.
157. See McLean & Zhang, supra note 2, at 137. If an order of performance is recognized,
then one party's performance naturally comes before the other's; therefore, only one party may
breach at a time, and simultaneous breach is precluded.
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on the lookout for something in Chemlmpex' performance which could be
deemed a simultaneous breach.'
X. CONCLUSION

The UCL is but one of a number of steps in the PRC's drive towards
developing a modem legal system in tune with its developing market
economy. It is necessary to remember that while the UCL contains many
terms and phrases which ring familiar in an international lawyer's ear, this
law is grounded in the PRC's nascent jurisprudence. Only by considering
the meaning ofthese terms and phrases within the PRC's brief legal history
can any practical meaning be discerned. This Note has explored the future
application of the UCL by considering previous analysis and Chinese
application of the UCL's predecessors. Extrapolating from sources
analyzing the application of the UCL's predecessors, this Note has shown
how the UCL should increase freedom of contract in China. Further, this
Note has shown how in many respects, the outcome of one particular
hypothetical would be very different under the UCL than under the
previous FECL. Future application of the UCL will judge this note's
extrapolation from the past.

158. McLean & Zhang explain:
ITihis concept of mutual or simultaneous breach is consistent with the Chinese
view of dispute settlement. Characterized by the phrase dividing one into two,
the Chinese view a dispute from each party's perspective. Thus, a foreign
litigant and its counsel should be prepared to argue such concepts before a
Chinese tribunal if disputes arise in transactions with Chinese enterprises.

Id. (citations omitted).
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